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CRIME BEGINS AT HOME:
LET'S STOP PUNISHING VICTIMS AND PERPETUATING
VIOLENCE
NATALIE LODER CLARK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been said and written during the past few years about
domestic violence. To a large extent, society is aware of the need
for shelters, counselling, legal services, and support groups for the
victims of spouse abuse.1 The victim's needs, psychological charac-
teristics, stages of victimization and recovery, and even the charac-
teristics and needs of the victim's children, are now apparent.2 Far
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. LL.M., Columbia University, 1973; J.D.,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, 1972; B.A., State University
of New York-Albany, 1963. The author wishes to thank research assistants Deborah
Krusche Bruck, John Burda, and Bruno Para, students at Northern Illinois University, for
their able and energetic assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. The problem of battered women gained recognition with the women's movement. Early
stages of the women's rights movement played a crucial role in achieving criminal prohibi-
tions against wife beating. Nevertheless, the law today fails to afford assaulted spouses full
protection and adequate remedies. Oppenlander, The Evolution of Law and Wife Abuse, 3
L. & POL'Y Q. 382, 385 (1981). Lenore Walker said,
The legal alternatives necessary for battered women [to reorder their lives] in-
clude: adequate police protection, easy access to restraining orders, facilitation
of prosecution procedures by assault victims, provision for temporary support
and maintenance, speedy divorces, regulated child visitation, and legitimate le-
gal procedures for battered women as defendants.
L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 206 (1979).
The importance and necessity of safe houses and shelters arises from the sense of commu-
nity and support that they provide to the abused spouse. Id. at 198. In the United States,
the establishment of such shelters is "in the infant stage. . . ." Id. at 197. The National
Organization for Women, women's resource centers, church groups, YWCAs, and commu-
nity mental health centers have established most of the programs that offer temporary
housing. Given the definite limitations from which many shelters suffer, however, much
more must be done. Existing shelters suffer from a limited potential for offering educational
and vocational training, meeting the needs of children, and eliminating crowding and sick-
ness. Id. at 200-02.
2. See generally A. JoNEs, WOMEN WHO KILL (1980); D. MARTIN, BATrERDm WivEs (1977);
L. WALKER, supra note 1.
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less is known about abusers, perhaps because they typically refuse
help or treatment.$
Many commentators have noted that, until recently, American
society regarded spouse abuse as acceptable behavior.4 Fortu-
nately, finding appreciation for jokes about wife abuse is increas-
ingly difficult these days; some enlightened audiences even refuse
to laugh when the subject of husband abuse is raised.' The great
emphasis on the remedies available to the victims of domestic vio-
lence, however, suggests that we still blame the victims, and not
the perpetrators, of spouse abuse.
American society can now point with pride to the help and ser-
vices it offers to an economically dependent abused spouse. A few
years ago, many of these services were nonexistent. Today, how-
ever, an abused spouse can leave her home and take refuge in a
battered woman's sheltere-a generally under-funded and some-
3. Abusers hesitate to recognize that they have a problem. L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 36.
Even when abusers recognize their problem, two primary reasons exist for their reluctance
to seek help: 1) a fear of apprehension by law enforcement authorities, and 2) a lack of
facilities able to provide adequate services. Id. at 202.
4. See, e.g., Oppenlander, supra note 1, at 384-85 (At common law, courts sustained a rule
of masculine force that permitted a husband to punish his wife with whip, fist, or any simi-
lar instrument.).
5. Family law experts assert that the problem of battered husbands is as destructive to
family relationships as the more common problem of battered wives. The reason that less is
known and reported about battered husbands is that men must confront different stereo-
types when they seek redress for their injuries. Men generally refuse to talk about being
battered because they feel it reflects poorly on their masculinity. Many physically abused
husbands, moreover, choose to stay at home to protect their children from their wives.
Jones, When Battered Women Fight Back, 9 BARsSTER 12, 14 (Fall 1982).
6.
Today there is a network of shelters to aid victims of domestic violence. The
shelter movement developed as a result of the efforts of people who wished to
fill the void left by police officers who did not want to treat domestic violence
as crime; by a court system that deliberately made it difficult to press charges;
by hospital emergency rooms that ignored the real causes of injury and ac-
cepted obviously false explanations that let [the batterer] off the hook; and by
traditional social services that were just plain insensitive to the needs of bat-
tered women. Now, shelters are rapidly becoming an integral part of our
communities.
Mikulski, Foreword: Family Violence-A National Issue, 6 VT. L. REv. vii, viii (1981). Be-
cause safe shelter provides the battered woman with time to consider her next course of
action, its importance cannot be overemphasized, especially when one considers how diffi-
cult the decision to leave home is for most battered women. Wesley, Breaking the Vicious
Circle: The Lawyer's Role, 6 VT. L. REv. 363, 370 (1981). For an illustrative account of one
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what shabby place that, nonetheless, provides a safe haven. Chil-
dren usually can accompany the victim if they are female or pre-
teenagers.1 Through legal aid, pro bono representation, or referrals
and money from shelter staff and remaining friends and family, if
any, not alienated by the abuser, the victim can seek a divorce,
custody, property division, and support. Appalled at the growing
class of poverty-stricken divorced women and their children, courts
and legislatures even are beginning to put some teeth into the en-
forcement of these remedies." The victim may even be lucky
week in a shelter, see T. DAVIDSON, CONJUGAL CRIME - UNDERSTANDING AND CHANGING THE
WIFnErTING PATTERN 155-75 (1978). For an alphabetical listing of shelters, projects and
agencies, see J. COSTA, ABUSE OF WOMEN: LEGISLATION, REPORTING AND PREVENTION 337-68
(1983).
7. Shelters often refuse to accept large sons, not only because their appearance may
frighten other shelter residents, but also because they may have learned to be abusive them-
selves from years of watching their parents' interactions. See infra note 14.
8. See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98
Stat. 1305; 42 U.S.C. §§ 650-667 (1983 & Supp. 1m 1985); 5 C.F.R. § 581 (1986); Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, 96 Stat. 763; Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 171-176, 96 Stat. 324, 401-04.
One place where this rapid growth of legislation aimed at domestic violence has occurred
is New York, where criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts to han-
dle cases involving spouse abuse. See, e.g., N.Y. CR. PRoc. L. § 530.11(1) (McKinney
1984). This broadening of the courts' jurisdiction gives the victim the right to choose the
forum which will hear the case. Criminal court judges in New York also have the power to
issue temporary and permanent orders of protection, as do judges in many other jurisdic-
tions. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 530.12(1) (McKinney 1984). Cases upholding the enforcement
of these legislative remedies have supported the response of criminal courts to the issue of
domestic violence in New York. See, e.g., People v. Mack, 53 N.Y.2d 803, 805-06, 422 N.E.2d
572, 573, 439 N.Y.S.2d 912, 913 (1981) (failure to advise victim of her right to elect a forum
did not divest either court of jurisdiction to hear assault charges in spite of defendant's
contention that such failure rendered any criminal action jurisdictionally defective); Bruno
v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 590, 393 N.E.2d 976, 980, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1979) (negotiated
consent decree ordered New York City police officers to respond as soon as possible to every
request for assistance and not to refrain from arresting an accused abuser because of a close
relationship between the victim and the abuser); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d
451, 462-65, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219, 227-29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (interpreting a final order or
protection to mean protection for both the mother and child after the father attempted to
cut off the child's leg with a saw), aff'd mem., 70 A.D.2d 573, 417 N.Y.S.2d 202 (N.Y. App.
Div. (1979).
Today, 48 states and the District of Columbia have passed legislation designed to protect
battered women. The rapid growth of domestic violence law in the United States is the
result of the broad interaction between community groups, legal service lawyers, shelter
workers and law enforcement officials. Lerman & Goldzweig, Protection of Battered
Women: A Survey of State Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 271 (1980). "To promote
enforcement of criminal law against abusers, ten states have enacted legislation making
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enough to find a still-functioning job placement and training pro-
gram for displaced homemakers.
In the context of this impressive array of remedies aimed at the
victim, a state's attorney may in a typical case be both annoyed
and nonplussed when a victim of domestic violence insists on pur-
suing criminal charges against an abuser, especially when the vic-
tim remained at home for some time after the battery.9 Prosecu-
tors sometimes may react in such a way even though the act of
gathering one's possessions and children and leaving home some
time after an assault can actually imply a high degree of real fear
that an attack may recur rather than the assumption that all is
well. Domestic violence always escalates, and one who has been
abused for many years may very reasonably develop a mortal
fear. 10 Past experience usually tells the victim that once a current
violent episode has ended, a breathing space will elapse before ten-
sions build up and explode again.1 Unfortunately, in these cases
the victim generally is unable to rely on effective police
assistance. 12
spouse abuse a separate criminal offense whether or not the victim has previously obtained
a protection order." Id. at 273.
9. For example, one woman sought to press charges despite remaining at home for two
days after her husband threatened to kill her and having endured physical abuse from him
for a period of several years. An advocate from the local battered women's shelter accompa-
nied the victim to the state's attorney's office and joined in her insistence that the attorney
file criminal charges. The advocate argued that the victim had a right to see her abuser
punished. Interview with Kathy Kauffman, shelter-staff advocate, Safe Passage, DeKalb, Ill.
The state's attorney hesitated to file because he believed revenge was a poor motive for
prosecution. Although the attorney eventually allowed the woman to sign a complaint, he
subsequently objected, asserting that he could not possibly obtain a conviction because the
victim had remained at home after the violent event occurred. Id.
10. One commentator has characterized the fear common to abused spouses as an "aware-
ness of death potential." L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 75. In these cases, "[b]attered women
all stated that they were aware their batterers could kill them. They knew the threats of
violence were not idle and that the batterers were capable of killing the women and/or
themselves." Id.
11. Domestic violence follows a cyclic pattern: tension building, violence, honeymoon (the
"breathing space"). Id. at 55. "Having struck a woman a first time seemed to make it easier
for the man to do it again. It is as if a taboo is broken and the behavior, once unleashed,
becomes uncontrollable." Id. at 79.
12. See Comment, Wife-Beating, Law and Society Confront the Castle Door, 15 GONZ. L.
REv. 171, 182-84 (1979). Some police officers may be reluctant to respond to domestic calls
due to the increased fear of injury. Whether an officer's fear of injury is legitimate is some-
what disputed. In 1980, the FBI reported that 33% of assaults on police officers and 12% of
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The prosecutor's still too-frequent response may be, "We have
serious crimes to take care of. We can't waste time on this." Be-
cause at least eighty percent of all perpetrators of violent crimes
confined in prisons have been abused or witnessed abuse of other
family members as children,13 however, one may well ask what
these "more important" crimes are. The violence prevalent in con-
temporary society may well be learned at home."
Because children can learn that violence is appropriate behavior
when one of their parents abuses the other, the crimes involved in
domestic violence should be considered serious. One reasonably
may conclude that the primary producer of violence in society is
violence in the home. American society has long recognized that
the family is its basic unit and the teacher and socializer of chil-
dren. The acceptance of serious crime in the home teaches perpe-
trators, victims, future perpetrators, and future victims that these
types of criminal behavior are tolerable when confined to the
home, away from the public gaze. Moreover, future perpetrators
and victims may learn that violent crime is generally appropriate
all officer deaths occurred while responding to domestic disturbance calls. Note, Domestic
Abuse Legislation in Illinois and Other States: A Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 1983
U. ILL. L. REv. 261, 267-68. At least one author has classified the FBI's statistics as an "old
cop's tale" and has referred to an officer's fear of injury as a reflection of "our general socie-
tal disregard for women." Jones, supra note 5, at 15. For a statistical evaluation of police
response in domestic disturbances, see Worden & Pollitz, Police Arrests in Domestic Dis-
turbances: A Further Look, 18 L. & Soc'Y REv. 105 (1984); see also Bruno v. Codd, 47
N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
13. Studies in California and Massachusetts have found that from 80% to "all" (San
Quentin) of adult and juvenile inmates convicted of violent crimes came from violent homes.
See generally ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENcE, Do You KNow WHICH CRIME
(1983).
14. "It seems clear that violence as a means of solving problems is a learned form of
behavior. A child learns how to 'be' from the models available, and when parents act as if
they have no internal means of control, they are demonstrating sanctioned behavior to their
kids." J. FLEMING, STOPPING Wn ABUSE 275-76 (1979). Studies have indicated that persons
who are battered as children, or who observe battering as an acceptable method of problem
solving, tend to repeat the pattern of abuse as adults. For example, in a study involving
1,146 families with children between ages 3 and 17 living at home, child abuse occurred at
the rate of 14 incidents for every 100 children. Straus, Family Patterns and Child Abuse in
a Nationally Representative American Sample, in 1 THE ABUSED CHILD IN THE FAMILY AND
THE COMMUNITY 213, 215 (1980). Another study found 49.1% of adult abusers had, as young
children, witnessed violence between their parents. J. FLEMING, supra, at 274; see also Free-
man, Violence Against Women: Does the Legal System Provide Solutions or Itself Consti-
tute the Problem? 7 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 215, 226 (1980); Comment, supra note 12, at 179.
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behavior whenever one is angry or frustrated.15 Despite this con-
nection between domestic violence and other serious crime, some
prosecutors do not see domestic violence as a serious problem for
the criminal justice system. The apparent message to abusers is
clear: if a victim objects strongly enough, the victim can take the
initiative and spend the money to find some helpful services to es-
cape; but society, as represented by the state, will ignore abusive
behavior in the home unless the victim insists on prosecution.
This Article suggests that criminal prosecutions are the best
remedy available for all domestic violence and that prosecutors
should seek it in chronic and severe cases even if the victim does
not insist upon, nor even request, such action. Tied to the abuser
by affection and by emotional, economic, and physical needs, the
victim may be blind to the serious nature of violent domestic
abuse. The legal system should not remain blind also.
II. PUNISHING THE VICTIM
The common suggestion that civil remedies available to the vic-
tim of domestic violence are more appropriate than criminal reme-
dies does not accord with the seriousness of violent crimes. The
widespread refusal to prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes is
a serious abuse of prosecutorial discretion, and the effect on the
victim can be devastating. Not only is the victim told that crime in
the family setting is less serious than similar crimes against stran-
gers, but the victim is also more likely than a stranger-victim to be
in continuing danger from the criminal.16
The pursuit of civil remedies always involves damaging, if not
completely destroying, a family unit that may function adequately
most of the time. The victim can take the children and flee, but if
15. See Comment, supra note 12, at 177.
16. Because of marriage or another type of emotional relationship, the victim feels forced
to remain close to the abuser. This raises the belief that the victim has no legal recourse,
and often allows the crime to go unpunished. See Comment, supra note 12, at 172.
A New York Supreme Court Justice recognized the problem when he stated, "For too
long, Anglo-American law treated a man's physical abuse of his wife as different from any
other assault, and, indeed, as an acceptable practice ... " Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047,
1048, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1979).
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they hide too long from the abuser, who may remain dangerous to
them for a long time, 17 many states would find the abused spouse
guilty of child-snatching.' 8 The victim can get an order of protec-
tion, but, as a result, the abuser will be ordered to leave home. The
victim can also seek a divorce. Finally, if the abused spouse lives in
a jurisdiction that has abrogated interspousal tort immunity for in-
tentional wrongs, the victim can sue the abuser for damages. This
final alternative offers no promise of stopping the abuse, however.19
Even if the abused spouse pursues criminal remedies, under the
current system the victim must insist on such remedies strenu-
ously. Finally, because the victim must initiate these divisive alter-
native remedies, the victim ironically can bear the onus of the fam-
fly's breakup.
The child-victim faces similar possibilities. The child can run
away, thus becoming a minor in need of supervision." If the child
lives in a jurisdiction that does not recognize parent-child tort im-
munity,21 the child-victim can bring an action for damages against
17. Abuse may continue long after divorce and physical separation. See, e.g., D. MARTIN,
supra note 2; L. WALKER, supra note 1.
18. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 710 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986); OREGON REv. STAT.
§§ 163.215-163.257 (1985); see also Fugitive Felon Act, 18 U.S.C. 1073 (1982) (original ver-
sion at ch. 271, § 1, 47 Stat. 326 (1932)), made applicable to parental kidnapping by section
10 of Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 6-10, 94 Stat.
3566, 3568-3573 (1980).
19. Although an interspousal tort suit may result in a damage award, it is not an effective
remedy because it fails to provide any physical protection for the abuse victim. Note, supra
note 12, at 266-67.
20. Juvenile courts and other authorities have recognized that status offenders such as
runaway children are much less amenable to correction while remaining in the community.
Although removing a child from the home is the last alternative in any case, status offenders
must often be contained before they can be counseled. Turner, Treatment of Juvenile De-
linquents, Juv. & FAm. CT. J., Nov. 1981, at 3-4.
21. Presently, 17 jurisdictions retain the doctrine in whole or in part. See Dennis v.
Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.C.D.C. 1968); Owens v. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9,
177 So. 133 (1937); Attwood v. Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982); Horton v.
Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d
152 (1952); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980); Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App.
577 (1895); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E.2d 128 (1924); Schneider v. Schnei-
der, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891);
Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99
N.W.2d 16 (1959); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966); Klop-
penburg v. Kloppenburg, 66 S.D. 167, 280 N.W. 206 (1938) (noting that state guest statute
would preclude parent-child litigation for automobile negligence); McKelvey v. McKelvey,
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the abuser, but this alternative offers no promise that the abuse
will stop. The child can perhaps persuade an adult, usually a social
worker, teacher, or doctor, to file a neglect or abuse petition in ju-
venile court, requesting placement in foster care, but this alterna-
tive has the negative effect of removing the child from all other
family members as well as the abuser. Finally, the child or a sym-
pathetic adult may request that a prosecutor file criminal charges.
If the abuse involves incest, the state's attorney may well cooper-
ate in this effort. If the abuse involves assault or battery, however,
the attorney may refuse to file because the legal right of parents to
impose reasonable corporal punishment on their children may pre-
clude establishing assault or battery beyond a reasonable doubt.22
Although society is less likely to require child-victims to initiate
legal process themselves, the remedies available, like those availa-
ble to spouse-victims, involve destruction of family relationships
and affect abusers only indirectly.
Several problems emerge when a spouse or child elects the self-
help remedy of running away. Apart from the legal wrongs of
child-snatching for the spouse and running away for the minor
child, the victim of domestic violence is often economically depen-
dent.28 . For the spouse, running away also creates a permanent
limbo in which one remains legally married to a spouse not seen or
heard from in years.
The tort remedy also has advantages and disadvantages. If the
plaintiff's lawyer consents to take the case on a contingent fee ba-
sis, the victim's initial financial outlay may be quite small-filing
fees and other such costs. Furthermore, any damages actually re-
covered may be financial help to an economically dependent vic-
111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954); LA. Rzv.
STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West. 1984).
22. When distinguishing abuse from legitimate corporal punishment becomes necessary,
the fact that physical assaults on children by parents, caretakers, and teachers often are
sanctioned by our culture complicates the determination. Freeman, The Rights of Children
in the International Year of the Child, 33 CURRENT LEGAL PROs. 1, 3 (1980). Thus far, only
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Hawaii, Maryland and the District of Columbia prohibit
the use of corporal punishment altogether in the educational context. LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CimnRE 526 (R. Horowitz & H. Davidson eds. 1984).
23. See generally A. JoNEs, supra note 2; D. MARTIN, supra note 2; L. WALKER, supra note
[Vol. 28:263
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tim. 24 This remedy provides little help, however, where the abuser
has little or no money to pay damages. Additionally, personal in-
jury actions for damages are notoriously slow in the court system,25
and filing suit in such cases is likely to anger the abuser and esca-
late the abuse. Moreover, interspousal tort immunity2" or parent-
24. See Comment, Wife Abuse: The Failure of Legal Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL J. PRAc.
& PROC. 549, 569 (1978).
25. See generally WALTER E. MEYER RESEARCH INST. OF LAW, DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE
AuToMOBILE VICTIM (1968).
26. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974); Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d
161 (Del. 1979); Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1982); Williams v. Ray, 146 Ga. App. 333,
246 S.E.2d 387 (1978); Peters v. Peters, 63 Hawaii 653, 634 P.2d 586 (1981); Guffy v. Guffy,
230 Kan. 89, 631 P.2d 646 (1981); Cloud v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 440 So. 2d 961
(La. Ct. App. 1983); Aitken v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 1040 (Miss. 1981);
Martinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 544 P.2d 444 (1975); Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383
N.E.2d 888 (1978); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964): McKinney v. Mc-
Kinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
The following state statutes address interspousal immunity generally: DEL CODE ANN. tit.
13 § 311 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 708.08 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-8
(Supp. 1986) (amended in 1983 to remove language providing husband as head of family but
continued interspousal tort immunity); HAwAI REv. STAT. § 573-5 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-203 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.291 (West Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-3-3
(1972) ("Husband and wife may sue each other" construed not to apply to tort actions
based on personal injury); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.290 (Vernon 1986); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 108.010 (1984) (allows wife to sue husband for intentional tort but not for negligent tort).
Although the above jurisdictions allow interspousal immunity generally, variations do ex-
ist. Several jurisdictions uphold and extend immunity to torts committed before divorce, for
example. See Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576, 95 S.E.2d 750 (1956); Ensminger v.
Campbell, 242 Miss. 519, 134 So. 2d 728 (1961); In re Marriage of Galloway, 547 S.W.2d 193
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
Other jurisdictions uphold immunity but do not extend it to torts committed shortly
before divorce. See Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971); Gremillion
v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. Ct. App. 1954); Kobe v. Kobe, 61 Ohio App. 2d 67, 399 N.E.2d
124 (1978).
Finally, some jurisdictions uphold immunity and extend it to torts committed during sep-
aration. See generally Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945) (one
spouse may not sue the other in tort whether they are living together or apart); Klein v.
Abramson, 513 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (wife would have had no cause of action,
had she survived, even though at the time of the tort the couple was not living together).
At least two state legislatures have abrogated explicitly the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity. The Illinois General Assembly recently enacted legislation specifically granting an
abused wife the right to sue her husband for an intentional tort and allowing the injured
spouse to recover medical expenses, loss of earnings and other damages. See Comment, Do-
mestic Violence: Illinois Responds to the Plight of the Battered Wife - The Illinois Do-
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child tort immunity 7 precludes suit in many jurisdictions.
Orders of protection, available in a growing number of states,
may serve to protect the victims of domestic violence. 2 These or-
ders, however, usually require that the abuser and the victim have
no contact whatsoever while the order is in force-terms certainly
not conducive to the preservation of the family. Divorce is also a
remedy that by its own terms breaks up the family relationship.
Because divorce cannot be administered on a contingent fee ba-
sis,29 the victim must have enough money at least to pay a retainer.
Although attorney's fees are awarded in appropriate cases,30 abus-
ers are notoriously difficult respondents in divorce actions. The
case may therefore take a long time to conclude and lead to virtu-
ally unenforceable interim orders.31 Furthermore, no guarantee ex-
mestic Violence Act, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 77, 96 (1982); see also N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 3-313(2) (McKinney 1978).
27. Many states struggle with the general issue of whether to allow actions between a
parent and a minor child for personal torts. Currently, states follow three basic approaches.
The first approach involves a modification of the doctrine "by creating exceptions consistent
with traditional justifications for the rule. . . ." Heise, Parental Immunity Doctrine: Con-
tinued Application, Modification, or Total Abrogation?, 8 J. Juv. L. 494, 494 (1984). The
second approach involves "total abrogation and application of the reasonable, prudent par-
ent [under] similar circumstances standard. . . ." Id. The last approach promotes the "con-
tinued application of the doctrine, leaving the task to the state legislature to modify or
abrogate the rule." Id.
28. A protective order is a judicial order written to prevent an abuser from behaving in a
particular manner. Under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, § 103, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
pare. 2301-1 to 2305-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986), a protective order can be temporary or
final. See Comment, supra note 26, at 90.
In some states, orders of protection are available only to spouses, precluding this remedy
for a child or paramour of an abuser. In other jurisdictions any family member may obtain
an order. Still other states will grant an order to any abused member of the abuser's house-
hold. Comment, Restraining Order Legislation for Battered Women: A Reassessment, 16
U.S.F. L. Rev. 703, 704-05 (1982).
29. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility states, "Because of the human
relationships involved and the unique character of the proceedings, contingent fee arrange-
ments in domestic relation cases are rarely justified." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONsIBILITY EC 2-20 (1979). For a discussion of professional responsibility in family law
practice, see generally S. GREEN & J. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAw AGREEMENTS § 6.13
et seq. (1984).
30. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND Divo cE ACT § 310 (1974).
31. If "no penalties for violations are imposed, '[a] frightened woman can get no comfort
from knowing that she has enlisted the power of the courts, for if the man is still at large to
do as he pleases, a[n] [unenforceable] piece of paper from the court can never stop him.'"
Comment, supra note 12, at 191-92 (quoting E. PIzzEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS
WILL HEAR 120 (1974)); see also Hoffman & Holmes, Husbands, Wives and Divorce, 4 FIve
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ists that divorce actually will stop the abusive behavior.32 Often,
neither party to the marriage wants a divorce; the victim merely
wants the abuse to stop and sees no other way to accomplish this
end. 5 If both parties prefer to continue their marriage, divorce
cannot be a suitable remedy.
For the child-victim, the juvenile court process may succeed in
ending the abuse. Court process, however, usually results in either
supervision of the child or removal of the child from the family
home. In either case, the focus is on the victim. No direct action to
punish or control the abuser is possible because such actions are
beyond the jurisdictional power of the juvenile court.34 Once again,
as with most of the available remedies, the victim is enabled to
escape the abuser, often at great personal cost, but the abuser is
not stopped from abusing.
Bringing criminal prosecutions only at the instigation and insis-
tence of the victim creates several problems. The abuser may be
subconsciously invited to escalate the abuse because everyone in-
volved knows that if the victim drops the charges and refuses to
cooperate in prosecution, the prosecutor will not proceed with the
THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES-PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 35, 36 (1975); Fathers
Who Don't Pay, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1984, at A2, col. 1.
32. Judges may fail to recognize that they might place the woman in a dangerous situa-
tion by granting the abuser rights to visit the children. Such "visits" often result in contin-
ued abuse. To avoid this problem, courts should order that visitation be allowed only in the
presence of a third party or at a place other than the abused spouse's home. See Comment,
supra note 12, at 191. "If a woman manages to get away and obtain a divorce, she still has
no guarantee of safety. Some ex-husbands continue to stalk and hunt down 'their women'
for years after a divorce, forcing their victims to move and change jobs continually." BAT-
TERED WOMEN 53 (D. Moore ed. 1979).
33. Psychological pressures restrain many women from leaving their husbands because
they are raised to believe that they must make their husbands happy. Some women there-
fore feel responsible for their beatings and may wait years for their husbands to change
before they seek divorce. See Gingold, One of These Days-Pow ! Right in the Kisser: The
Truth About Battered Wives, Ms., Aug. 1976, at 51-52.
34. Most juvenile courts have the express authority to order only the following types of
sanctions in juvenile cases: specific programs or facilities for the child, with payment by
parents; placement of the child in an institution, with parental participation conditioned on
the avoidance of other remedies; detention of the child; fines against delinquent children;
and restitution by delinquent children. See Peterson, The Authority of the Court, Juv. &
FAm. CT. J., May 1983, at 7, 14-16.
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case. In cases involving violent crimes not in the family setting,
such terrorizing of necessary witnesses is actively discouraged."6
The messages thus given to the abuser and the victim seem
rather strange. The abuser must conclude that abusing a family
member is permissible so long as the victim is prevented from
complaining to the authorities. The victim, on the other hand, per-
ceives pressure not to object to this particular form of criminal be-
havior because no one else cares about it or wants to take action to
stop the abuser. With most crimes, the initial complaint comes
from the victim, and the victim's testimony is often necessary for
conviction. Although state's attorneys urge and can even coerce
victims to testify in most criminal cases, when violent crime occurs
in the home against family members they refuse to take action un-
less the victim insists upon prosecution and is willing to testify. In
many cases, however, the prosecutor could proceed without the
victim's testimony because other evidence of the abuser's guilt
often exists.36
III. PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION
Many writers have commented on the functions of penalizing
criminal conduct. With the passage of time, reasons have become
increasingly pragmatic. In 1789, Jeremy Bentham wrote:
The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in
common, is to augment the total happiness of the community;
and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as far as may be,
35. Witness intimidation refers to threats made by defendants to discourage or prevent
victims or eyewitnesses from testifying at a hearing or trial of the accused. Three basic
forms of witness intimidation exist: (1) a blatant threat or the actual use of force against the
witness, (2) family, community or cultural pressures, and (3) fear-whether real or
imagined-of repercussions by the accused. Graham, Witness Intimidation, 12 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 240, 244 (1984).
Victims of domestic violence may be particularly susceptible to witness intimidation. A
study conducted by New York's Victim Services Agency and the Vera Institute of Justice
found that the witnesses most likely to be threatened were witnesses involved in serious
cases, witnesses who were acquainted with the perpetrator before the crime, and female
witnesses. See Connick & Davis, Examining the Problem of Witness Intimidation, 66 Junm-
cATuRH 439, 440 (1983).
36. Other witnesses capable of testifying against the abuser likely include police officers,
shelter personnel, teachers, counselors, neighbors, and relatives.
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everything that tends to subtract from that happiness: in other
words, to exclude mischief.
But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.
Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it
ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude
some greater evil.
3 7
Bentham went on to say that punishment should not be permitted
when the act in question is not really "mischievous," when punish-
ment cannot prevent mischief, when the punishment is more mis-
chievous than the crime, and when the mischief will abate without
punishment. 8 Similarly, a presidential commission wrote:
The action taken against lawbreakers is designed to serve three
purposes beyond the immediately punitive one. It removes dan-
gerous people from the community; it deters others from crimi-
nal behavior; and it gives society an opportunity to attempt to
transform lawbreakers into law-abiding citizens . 3
Both of these utilitarian views seem to proceed upon the rather
jaded assumption that wrongdoers know the values of their society
and know themselves to be doing wrong.
In 1531, Martin Luther suggested two purposes of law. The first
sought to restrain humankind's natural bent to "unrighteousness"
by threatening to punish those who commit clearly wrong
acts4°0-an early deterrence argument. The second, however, sought
to reveal unto a man his sin, his blindness, his misery, his impi-
ety, ignorance, hatred and contempt of God, death, hell, the
judgment and deserved wrath of God....
This, as it is the proper and the principal use of the law, so it
is very profitable and also most necessary. For if any be not a
murderer, an adulterer, a thief, and outwardly refrain from sin
... he would swear.., that he is righteous; and therefore he
conceiveth an opinion of righteousness, and presumeth of his
37. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158 (J.
Burns & H. Hart eds. 1970).
38. Id. at 159.
39. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUsTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocumT 7 (1967).
40. M. LUTHER, A COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS, reprinted in J.
DILLENBERGER, MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM HIS WRITINGS 139 (J. Dillenberger ed.
1961).
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good works and merits. Such a one God cannot otherwise mollify
and humble, that he may acknowledge his misery and damna-
tion, but by the law.41
John Calvin wrote in a similar vein in 1559:
[W]hile [the law] shows God's righteousness, .. it warns, in-
forms, convicts, and lastly condemns, every man of his own un-
righteousness .... [A]s soon as he begins to compare his powers
with the difficulty of the law, he has something to diminish his
bravado .... Thus man, schooled in the law, sloughs off the ar-
rogance that previously blinded him .... [A]fter he is com-
pelled to weigh his life in the scales of the law, laying aside all
that presumption of fictitious righteousness, he discovers that he
is a long way from holiness, and is in fact teeming with a multi-
tude of vices, with which he previously thought himself
undefiled.4
2
Thomas More expressed an even simpler version of the idea: "All
laws, they [the Utopians] say, are passed with the sole reason of
1243reminding each man of his duty....
More recently, Herbert Morris," Robert Nozick,4 5 and Jean
Hampton" have asserted moral education to be a justification for
criminal punishments. Indeed, Hampton goes further and suggests
that "by reflecting on the educative character of punishment...
we can provide a full and complete justification for it."47 She
continues:
[A]ccording to the moral education theory, punishment is not
intended as a way of conditioning a human being to do what
society wants her to do (in the way that an animal is condi-
tioned by an electrified fence to stay within a pasture); rather,
41. Id. at 140-41.
42. J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, reprinted in 20 THE LIBRARY OF
CHIUSTIAN CLASSICS, at 354-55 (1960).
43. T. MORE, UTOPIA 94 (Washington Square Press ed. 1965) (1516). The law's role in
educating wrongdoers has even earlier antecedents. See, e.g., Romans 3:20 ("Through the
law comes knowledge of sin.").
44. Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 264 (1981).
45. R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981).
46. Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208
(1984).
47. Id. at 209.
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the theory maintains that punishment is intended as a way of
teaching the wrongdoer that the action she did (or wants to do)
is forbidden because it is morally wrong and should not be done
for that reason. The theory also regards that lesson as public,
and thus as directed to the rest of society. When the state makes
its criminal law and its enforcement practices known, it conveys
an educative message not only to the convicted criminal but also
to anyone else in the society who might be tempted to do what
she did.
[T]he state.., wants to use the pain of punishment to get the
human wrongdoer to reflect on the moral reasons for that bar-
rier's existence, so that he will make the decision to reject the
prohibited action for moral reasons, rather than for the self-in-
terested reason of avoiding pain.
[I]t is incorrect to regard simple deterrence as the aim of pun-
ishment; rather, to state it succinctly, the view maintains that
punishment is justified as a way to prevent wrongdoing insofar
as it can teach both wrongdoers and the public at large the
moral reasons for choosing not to perform an offense.' s
This educational function of law-to teach members of society
that certain behavior is morally wrong or socially intolerable-is
undermined by nonenforcement, as is its deterrent effect. As Kad-
ish said:
First, the moral message communicated by the law is contra-
dicted by the total absence of enforcement; for while the public
sees the conduct condemned in words, it also sees in the dra-
matic absence of prosecutions that it is not condemned in deed.
Moral adjurations vulnerable to a charge of hypocrisy are self-
defeating no less in law than elsewhere. Second, the spectacle of
nullification of the legislature's solemn commands is an un-
healthy influence on law enforcement generally.49
48. Id. at 212-13.
49. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, reprinted in 7 AP. CR. L.Q. 17, 20
(1968). As his title suggests, Kadish does not propose to resurrect the teaching functions of
criminal law; he advocates that society should avoid "use of the criminal law purely to en-
force a moral code," such as "the laws prohibiting extra-marital and abnormal sexual inter-
course. .. ." Id. He concludes correctly that such laws ought to be repealed. His arguments,
however, also support this Article's conclusion that criminal laws against domestic violence
should be enforced.
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Thus, if unenforced the law may produce the opposite of its in-
tended effect: if so inclined, people will behave as the law allows
and not as it commands.
For Luther and Calvin, and probably for the author of Romans
as well, one learns through the law by trial and conviction, self-
imposed or otherwise. Because the law of which they speak is the
entire scheme of values by which one ought to live, they view con-
formity to the law as an impossibility; one's conviction of guilt will
necessarily come and lead one to seek deliverance through grace.50
In contrast, the teaching function of the more limited criminal
law spoken of by Thomas More and Jean Hampton and addressed
in this Article may be achieved either by reading and listening to
learn what conduct is prohibited or by violating the law and exper-
iencing trial and conviction. If one previously has learned, through
lack of enforcement, that the law did not mean what it said, the
latter method of teaching may be required. The clich6d rule that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse" explicitly permits this learning
method in our criminal justice system. Apparently, the justification
is based upon the dual assumptions that the law is published and
therefore can be known, and that good citizens either ought to
know the law intuitively or be able to discern it whenever circum-
stances reasonably suggest the need.51
The legal history of spouse and child abuse reflects a gradual
movement from a nearly unfettered right of husbands and fathers
to correct, chastise, and punish other family members, 52 to the cre-
ation of some limitations," and finally to special recognition of
family violence and its remedies." Although the modern statutes
preserve a right to batter one's spouse or child with impunity
50. See J. CALVIN, supra note 42, at 355-56; M. LUTHER, supra note 40, at 141.
51. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). In that case, the defendant's
conviction for remaining in Los Angeles more than five days without registering as a previ-
ously convicted felon was overturned because "violation of [the ordinance]'s provisions is
unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city being the test." Id. at
229. The Court, quoting Holmes, said, "'A law which punished conduct which would not be
blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for that commu-
nity to bear."' Id. (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881)).
52. See State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588 (1886); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEsTARIES 445 (1884).
53. See generally Comment, Corporal Punishment in the Schools: A Time for Change, 4
J. Juv. L. 155 (1980).
54. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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under some circumstances that would be criminal if done by a
stranger, their overall effect is to resurrect the possibility of crimi-
nal responsibility for family batterers who stop short of death or
permanent injury. Modern statutes notify the citizenry that do-
mestic violence will be tolerated less than' in the past. Case law also
exists that upholds criminal charges against family members who
perpetrate traditional crimes, almost in the same manner as if the
victims had been strangers. s In the crime of incest, for example,
the victim must be, by definition, a family member.5
Many people, however, including some in law enforcement and
others who are spouse or child abusers, continue to view domestic
violence as a familial, not a societal, problem. 7 Moreover, in any
event, many people view so-called simple assaults as minor
crimes,58 sometimes even if committed repeatedly, as long as the
perpetrator was legally present in the victim's home. As a result,
some reluctance to use criminal remedies for domestic violence
persists. Victims are still urged, often by the statutes themselves,59
to seek civil remedies or other private redress. These civil solu-
tions, however, ignore not only the societal harm resulting from
domestic violence, but also the teaching function of the criminal
law.
One of the most effective ways to stop domestic violence is to
make clear to abusers and potential abusers that society will not
tolerate it. Such is the function of law articulated by More, Luther,
Calvin, and Kadish, and the explicit function of criminal law for at
least More and Kadish.60 Criminal convictions will make clear, as
nothing else in adult experience could do, the moral wrong of en-
gaging in domestic violence. Indeed, where criminal law has been
so used, it has succeeded startlingly well. 1
55. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
56. States usually define criminal incest more narrowly than civil incest sufficient to nul-
lify a marriage between relatives. See, e.g., H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTc RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 10, 357 (1968).
57. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTIcE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TAsK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE:
FINAL REPORT 22-24 (1984).
58. See supra note 12.
59. See supra note 8.
60. See T. MORE, supra note 43 at 94; Kadish, supra note 49, at 32-34.
61. "A victim's chance of future assault was nearly two and a half times greater when
officers did not make an arrest. . . .[T]he assaulter views the enhanced stature of the vic-
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Legal philosophers have long recognized that criminal punish-
ment need not be severe to be effective. As Barnes and Teeters
said, "History shows that severe punishments have never reduced
criminality to any marked degree. '6 2 Certainty of punishment is
more effective. According to Bentham, "If punishment consisted
merely in taking from the guilty the fruits of his offence, and if
that punishment were inevitable, no offence would ever be commit-
ted. . . .[Tihe more certain punishment is, the less severe it need
be.",6 3
The most common "fruit" of domestic violence appears to be
power-the power to control the persons and lives of one's fellow
family members. 4 Although the abuser can no longer exercise that
power if the victim leaves the family household, the victim's ex-
treme accommodation-leaving home-provides the abuser with a
successful "power play." Criminal remedies, on the other hand, by
focusing upon the abuser, leave the rest of the family intact, di-
rectly "taking from the guilty the fruits of his offence. '6 5 Instead of
the abuser controlling the victim's person or life, the abuser's life
and person are instead subjected to control by the state.
The likelihood of apprehension and conviction could be nearly
100% in non-fatal domestic violence cases. Once a victim makes a
complaint, evidence is usually available and the identity of the
perpetrator is always known. As a result, punishment could be vir-
tually certain. As previously noted, punishment need not be severe
as long as it is certain. Where prosecution has been increased and
light sentences imposed, the goal of deterrence has been
achieved.6
Both philosophy and common sense suggest that criminal reme-
dies are an appropriate societal response to domestic violence. The
perpetrator of domestic crimes thus will learn that such conduct is
wrong before it escalates into manslaughter, murder, or rape,6 7 and
tim and subsequent arrest and overnight incarceration as a judgment that his behavior is
criminal." U.S. DEP'T. OF JUsTIcE, supra note 57, at 24.
62. H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 286 (3d ed. 1965).
63. J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 201 (N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd. ed. 1975).
64. See L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 42-54.
65. J. BENTHAM, supra note 63, at 201.
66. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, supra note 57, at 24.
67. See L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 208-09.
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before the abuser's children learn that violence is the way to cope
with life. 8
IV. THE ABUSER-PERPETRATOR
If abusers do learn violence as a way to cope with stress or ex-
press emotions,69 then society must take actions which teach more
appropriate ways to deal with family members. For example, a suc-
cessful suit for damages teaches the abuser that violent behavior
comes only at the money cost of the damage done. The loss of a
spouse or custody of a child in a divorce or juvenile proceeding
teaches the abuser that the victim can obtain legal assistance to
break family ties after episodes of violent behavior. If criminal
prosecution depends upon the insistence of the victim, however,
the abuser learns that the state will drop the prosecution if the
abuser can change the victim's mind. Only vigorous prosecution,
brought and continued at the state's initiative, teaches the abuser
that such behavior is unacceptable to society.
Those rare instances where such prosecutions have been under-
taken and reported have resulted in a phenomenal success rate.70
The always-present goal of the criminal justice sys-
tem-rehabilitation-has been achieved. Unfortunately, resistance
to the vigorous use of criminal sanctions in the fight against do-
mestic violence still remains. Police officers and prosecutors, who
deal with criminals constantly, recognize that almost every of-
fender presents some sympathetic characteristics that make prose-
cution to the fullest extent possible unattractive as a remedy 1
This factor, along with time pressures on the criminal courts, may
partially account for the reduced charges and lesser penalties of
the plea bargaining process. Many criminals have families, jobs,
and respectable reputations in the community. The criminal jus-
tice system has long recognized, sometimes with approval and
sometimes with criticism, the mitigating effect of these factors in
68. Straus, supra note 14, at 220-21.
69. See id. at 220.
70. See U.S. DEP'T oF JuSn.c, supra note 57, at 24.
71. Many state's attorney's offices have a screening process that tends to discourage
rather than encourage prosecution. "Very few marital assault arrests survive the prosecu-
tor's screening process." Comment, supra note 24, at 563-64.
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prosecution and sentencing. 2 When they accompany a perception
that the victim "asked for it" or that the crime is not really seri-
ous, the chances of vigorous prosecution decline still further.73
The prosecutor and judge often can identify in many ways with
the abuser. For example, many abusers are employed, respectful,
persuasive, and charming. 74 The abuser will promise to reform and
often means it.7 5 After all, any married person, or anyone else who
has shared a sexual relationship with another person, knows how
angry one can become when conflicts arise within that relationship.
Furthermore, in the domestic case, the abuser explains the anger
and minimizes the violent nature of the abuse. The abuser's family
is often dependent on the abuser's income, and the judge and
state's attorney may assume that the loss of income would be
worse than the continuation of the abuse. Moreover, the abuser is
likely to have no prior criminal record because earlier instances of
abuse, even if handled by the police, are unlikely to have led to
arrests or convictions. 7 To the prosecutor and judge, therefore,
punishment often seems an inappropriate remedy.
Although rehabilitation is one of the stated purposes of criminal
punishment, those who work in the criminal justice system know
72. For a discussion of the preparation of mitigating evidence, see generally Cotsirilos &
Stephenson, Basic Strategy in Federal Criminal Defense Litigation, 8 LITIGATION, Fall
1981, at 36, 59.
73. Wives who remain passive and do not confront their abusers may do so out of a rea-
sonable fear of retaliation from the abuser. Unfortunately, a common attitude toward these
types of abuse victims can be that they therefore acquiesce in or even provoke attacks. See,
e.g., Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the
Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 281-83 (1985).
74. The problem of domestic violence cuts across all social lines and affects "families re-
gardless of their economic class, race, national origin, or educational background." Note,
supra note 12, at 262. Commentators have indicated that domestic violence is prevalent
among upper middle-class families. In particular, dentists are the most physically violent of
all professionals, while lawyers, the least physically abusive professionals, tend to engage in
psychological abuse. National Bar Association Holds Interspousal Violence Seminar, 4
FAm. L. REP. 2697, 2698 (1978).
75. Many abusers regret their actions after a violent episode. During the episode, how-
ever, "they are either convinced that what they are doing is right, or some outside force
(liquor, drugs, wife's behavior) has caused them to lose control." J. FLEMING, supra note 14,
at 289. Promises to reform are part of the honeymoon phase of the cycle of domestic vio-
lence. See L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 65-66.
76. Eventually, of course, the profile of an abuser comes to include records of prior arrests
and convictions. See Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered
Women, 7 VT. L. REv. 1, 10 (1982).
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that recidivism rates are high. Studies do not support the hope
that prosecution and severe punishment ultimately might lead a
criminal to abandon criminal behavior. 77 Because the spouse or
child abuser is violent only against the small group that constitutes
the abuser's family, leaving the abuser at large is not obviously
dangerous to society. The abuser's crime is not so reprehensible or
shocking to the public mores that prison time is required to satisfy
public outrage. Until state's attorneys learn that criminal prosecu-
tion followed by moderate but meaningful sentencing will often
stop the abuser from being violent again, no reason seems to exist
for prosecuting or punishing this class of criminal.
If the abuser, by use of threats, promises, or a combination of
the two,78 can persuade the victim to be ambivalent about prosecu-
tion, the state's attorney will also be dubious about winning the
case. The victim who is influenced through uncertainty, fear, or de-
sire not to harm a spouse or parent is unlikely to be a convincing
witness. Further to complicate the situation, individuals who may
have knowledge of the abuser's activities, such as police officers,
staff members and volunteers at battered women's shelters, 9 and
family service workers, may not even be asked to testify.
A judge or prosecutor who is not also an abuser may have diffi-
culty believing that the abuser has engaged in serious violence. For
some reason, they find believing that punches thrown in a barroom
77. The rehabilitation theory of punishment has been downgraded for a number of funda-
mental reasons. First and foremost of these is that punishment does little or nothing to
reduce recidivism. In 1967, Robert Martinson collected data from 231 studies of correctional
treatment and ultimately concluded "that the present array of correctional treatments has
no appreciable effect-positive or negative-on the rates of recidivism of convicted offend-
ers." Lopez, The Crime of Criminal Sentencing Based on Rehabilitation, 11 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REv. 533, 550 (1981) (quoting Martinson, The Paradox of Prison Reform, reprinted in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, at 309, 317 (G. Erzosky ed. 1972)); see also
Von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42 MD. L. REv. 6, 10-
11 (1983).
78. Many abuse victims subjected to recurrent threats of violence from the abuser are
afraid to bring charges or often drop the charges once brought. A study of 7,500 wives in the
District of Columbia who sought to file charges against their abusers concluded that "fewer
than 200 actually achieved their objective." J. FLEMING, supra note 14, at 331.
79. Subpoenaing counselors of battered women's programs and shelters is a recent nation-
wide trend in domestic violence cases. The danger inherent in this practice is that it creates
fear and threatens the confidentiality needed to create a therapeutic environment for the
abuse victim. National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., Family Law, 17 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 1018, 1022-23 (1984).
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brawl were meant to and did cause serious harm easier than believ-
ing that a violent argument over a late dinner or where to hang a
portrait was meant to cause injury, even if injury actually occurred.
If the prosecutors or judges are themselves abusers, then they are
almost as eager as the defendant to settle or drop the case. They
do not want it to be taken seriously.
In short, the abuser may have the opportunity to sidetrack the
criminal justice system. The appearance and demeanor of the de-
fendant, and the prosecutor's or judge's own experience of family
arguments and reluctance to treat a useful citizen like a common
criminal, may combine to outweigh the available evidence of injury
done to the victim.
Even when the defendant is not very appealing, or the evidence
of serious harm is very strong, a general belief that the abuser's
behavior cannot be changed may lead prosecutors and judges not
to try. Thus, no one tells the abuser that this violent behavior to-
ward other family members is wrong. As a result, abusers have no
motivation to change their behavior. If the victim escapes by sever-
ing family ties,80 the abuser can still acquire a new family and a
new victim.
V. EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL REMEDIES
A. Murder
The criminal justice system already effectively deals with domes-
tic violence culminating in murder. Fortunately, people take mur-
der seriously, even when it occurs in a domestic setting. Unfortu-
nately, however, murder within the family is not usually seen as
the predictable end of domestic violence.81 If it were so seen, crimi-
80. One of the most commonly noted reasons for divorce is physical abuse. In addition,
wives complain of abuse 11 times more frequently than husbands do in divorce cases. Lev-
inger, Sources of Marital Dissatisfaction Among Applicants for Divorce, 36 AM. J. ORTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 803, 805 (1966); O'Brien, Violence in Divorce Prone Families, 33 J. MARRIAGE &
FA 692, 698 (1971).
81. Studies seem to bely this perception. The FBI, for example, has estimated that 27%
of all homicides occur within the family. Dvoskin, Legal Alternatives for Battered Women
Who Kill Their Abusers, 6 BULL. AAPL 335, 339-40 (1978). A 1958 study, found that 41%
of all female murder victims were killed by an intimate, such as a husband. Only 11% of
male homicide victims were killed by their wives. M. WOLFGANG, PATrERNS IN CRIMINAL
HoMIcmE 213 (1958).
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nal prosecution of abusers would be common. The use of vigorous
criminal prosecution in cases where domestic violence has not yet
reached murderous consequences 2 would reduce the number of
such murders, both those committed by unchecked abusers and
those committed by desperate victims who see no other available
protection for themselves
B. Rape
Marital rape is a form of violence present in about one-third of
the cases seen at women's shelters.8 4 In many jurisdictions, spousal
rape is not a crime.85 In those states where it is criminal, the
lengthy sentences usually imposed for rape convictions, often stat-
utorily required, make rape an unattractive charge where the aim
is rehabilitation. Prosecution for marital rape should be used only
when the abuser has not been rehabilitated after earlier convic-
tions for lesser offenses involving domestic violence.
82. One author has suggested that domestic violence can be prevented by eliminating
structural violence (the roots of personal and domestic violence) and replacing it with coop-
erative values. See Gil, The Social Context of Domestic Violence: Implications for Preven-
tion, 6 VT. L. REv. 339, 355 (1981).
83. See generally A. JoNEs, supra note 2, at 281-320.
84. Marital rape is a serious social and legal problem. One study estimates that as many
as 14% of all married women may be victims of sexual violence sometime during their mar-
riage. Another study found that marital rape numbers in the millions annually. Harman,
Consent, Harm, and Marital Rape, 22 J. FA. L. 423, 424 (1983-84). Because marital rape is
not a crime in most states, few statistics are available. The studies that do exist report that
approximately 36% of all battered women have been raped by their husbands. Finkelhor &
Yllo, Rape in Marriage: A Sociological View, in THE DARK SIDE oF FAMiLIEs: CURRENT FAM-
MY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 119-20 (1983).
85. "As of January 1984, the rape laws of 28 states still provide an express marital rape
exemption; only 8 states have entirely abandoned the exemption." Rickenburg & Schulmon,
Florida, New York, and Virginia Courts Declare Marital Rape a Crime, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 745, 745 (1984).
The judiciary has been much more vigorous in refusing to recognize a "common law"
marital rape exemption, however. Id. The New York Court of Appeals recently became the
first court in the nation to eliminate an explicit marital rape exemption from a state crimi-
nal-rape statute. The court held that the statutory distinction between marital rape and
nonmarital rape was "based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage" and violated the equal protection clause. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 163-69, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (1984).
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C. Incest
An estimated twenty-five percent of all female children suffer
some kind of sexual advance or contact by an adult male relative
during childhood.8 6 Because society regards incest and other sexual
advances upon children with horror, the state is likely to invoke
criminal penalties. The statutory sentences accompanying these
penalties tend to be long. Some have argued that criminal prosecu-
tion in this area should be pursued sparingly and only after efforts
at family therapy have failed, 7 but this argument is precisely the
one that some people made when society began to object to other
forms of domestic violence. The argument now appears to have
been wrong in cases of assault and battery; therefore, it should be
questioned in incest cases as well.
D. Child Abuse
Physical abuse of children, like spouse abuse, is under-prose-
cuted unless it escalates to the point of killing or causing perma-
nent injury to the child involved. The fact that corporal punish-
ment is legal when used on children legally within one's custody as
long as it is not excessive and unreasonable" severely hinders
criminal prosecution in cases where no serious injury has yet oc-
curred. This problem makes the child abuse case an inappropriate
avenue to initiate legal change, although prosecutions in this area
hopefully will follow quickly once prosecution of spouse abuse
cases becomes an established pattern.
86. Surveys indicate that 5,000 cases of incest are reported each year in the United
States. For every reported case, another 10 to 20 go unreported. Coleman, Incest: A Proper
Definition Reveals the Need for a Different Legal Response, 49 Mo. L. REv. 251, 252-53
(1984).
87. Pursuing criminal prosecution can be an embarrassing and traumatic experience for
the child incest victim. As Coleman said, "Taking into account all the people involved in an
incest investigation,... it is not unusual for a child to have to repeat her story six or seven
times.... [I]t is little wonder that the child suffers severe psychological damage .. " Id.
Some professionals advocate avoiding criminal prosecution because of the great potential for
emotional and psychological damage. See id. at 273 n.153.
88. For a discussion of legitimate corporal punishment, see Hampton, supra note 46, at
217, 217 n.16.
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E. Spousal assault and battery
Spousal assault and battery is the most seriously under-prose-
cuted crime in the area of domestic violence. Although assault and
battery is a violent crime, many spouses feel free to commit it
again and again. A consistent pattern of criminal prosecution and
sentencing has the potential not only to reduce the incidence of
this crime but also, by breaking patterns of domestic violence, 9 to
reduce the number of marital rapes and spousal murders as well.
Once the crime is reported and investigation shows that it actu-
ally was committed, the state's attorney should prosecute the case,
regardless of the degree of cooperation from the victim. Both the
abuser and the victim must be made to realize that assault and
battery are crimes, even when they occur in the home. Although
the victim may seek to drop the charges out of fear, economic de-
pendence, or an effort to be cooperative or conciliatory with the
abuser, the state's attorney is not bound by any of these limita-
tions. The state, not the victim, prosecutes criminals; we need
hardly reflect upon the fact that if the judicial system required the
victim to press charges, few prosecutions for murder would ever
occur!
The assault of one's spouse is no less an offense against the crim-
inal law than is an assault and battery against anyone else. The
unusual complications in spousal assault cases arise only from the
close relationship between the criminal and the victim. The pri-
mary issue raised by these facts is whether the victim consented.
The law does not make clear, however, whether one can consent
effectively to the crime of assault, thus negating its criminality.90
Furthermore, the idea that one who remains with an abuser con-
sents to the battery is similar to the now discredited and outmoded
notion that marriage gives perpetual consent to rape. Violence is
not part of the marriage contract; nor does anything in the law
89. The Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence recently made the following
recommendations for the justice system: "1. Family violence should be recognized and re-
sponded to as a criminal activity. 2. Law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges
should develop a coordinated response to family violence." U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, supra
note 57, at 10.
90. Consent is a defense to minor types of offensive touching such as a kiss or caress;
however, consent is less effective for hard blows and more serious injuries. W. LAFAvE & A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRiMINAL LAW 608 (1972).
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require that one either repudiate the whole marriage contract or
accept a spouse's violence.
In any given jurisdiction, the first few prosecutions for simple
assault and battery occurring in the domestic arena will present
problems. Until state's attorneys and judges become accustomed to
such cases, as is true with anything new, the case preparation must
be unusually careful and thorough. Initially, the effort probably
will be disproportionate to the harm caused by the crime. The ef-
fort is worth making, however, because the eases will eventually
become routine, creating the long term social benefits of dimin-
ished domestic violence, and, perhaps, preserved marriages and
families.
VI. THE PROTOTYPICAL CASE
In most cases no special thought or ability is required to estab-
lish that an assault and battery occurred. The prime difficulty will
be in persuading judges, perpetrators, victims, and defense counsel
that the violence matters and that this is a case worth taking seri-
ously. Those members of the criminal justice system must address
four factors: 1) that the victims' consent cannot be presumed and
in any case is irrelevant; 2) that violent treatment of one spouse or
cohabitor by the other is not trivial or minor because severe as-
saults and batteries do occur in the domestic context; 3) that do-
mestic violence follows consistent and predictable patterns that
courts and prosecutors need to understand; and 4) that threats
from the abuser are probable and must be handled accordingly.
A. Consent
The victim of spousal battery most likely hac not consented to
being abused. Consent comes before the act, and even the victim
who says "go ahead and hit me" presumably is speaking sarcasti-
cally, not giving consent. What will often appear as consent in this
area actually is a form of forgiveness or acceptance. If the victim
does not leave home and end the marriage after one or two violent
episodes, the tradition has apparently been to assume that the vic-
tim likes, or at least assents to, the victimization. If the victim does
not resort to self help, the criminal justice system will not help
either. Failure to move out of the home and get a divorce, however,
cannot reasonably be said to equal consent to abuse. The victim
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may stay out of fear or in the hope that the violence will cease,
leaving only the good parts of the marriage. Neither of these pos-
sibilities looks much like the consent given, for example, by prize
fighters to be battered by one another."
B. Triviality
A recent newspaper article quoted a lawyer as saying that an or-
der of protection was too readily available in one county in Illi-
nois.92 He cited a recent case where the judge entered an order of
protection against a man as a result of an incident which.the law-
yer described as a "tussle" over a tape recorder.9 3 These state-
ments provide two prime examples of trivialization. The cause of a
violent argument often makes the whole incident seem trivial. For
example, an argument over a burned meal, use of the car, or a tape
recorder does not sound terribly serious to some people. The same
method of trivialization, however, could doubtless be applied to
other battery cases as well. The causes of barroom brawls often
include such earth-shaking items as dart games, football scores,
and television program choices. Clearly the original cause of an ar-
gument is irrelevant to the degree and significance of the resulting
violence; sometimes even murders result from causes such as those
listed above.
The other trivialization in the lawyer's statement is the word
"tussle." To speak of a violent argument over a tape recorder as a
"tussle" conjures up different pictures for people in different rela-
tionships. For those who live in non-battering families, the word
may suggest a severe verbal argument. For those who have lived in
a family where violent argument included punching, hitting, kick-
ing, or other dangerous and harmful behavior, however, the image
will be different. The lawyer quoted in the newspaper no doubt
heard an account of a violent argument and translated it into ter-
minology appropriate to a less violent marriage. The cure for this
type of trivialization is to define carefully the terms one uses and
91. "[C]onsent of a participant in sports, such as football and boxing, is a defense to
tackles and blows, not likely to kill or seriously injure, delivered in accordance with the rules
of the game." Id.
92. Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1984, §1, at 1, col. 1.
93. Id.
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to apply language appropriate to the facts, rather than applying
one's own misconceptions. The twists of language should not ob-
scure the fact that a violent assault has been committed against a
human being.
C. Patterns of domestic violence
A wealth of literature exists concerning "domestic violence syn-
drome" and other aspects of violent family life. This literature has
become relevant in the legal process in many settings: establishing
self-defense to murder charges brought against victims of domestic
violence who finally kill their abusers, 4 procuring orders of protec-
tion,95 defining cruelty grounds for divorce, 96 determining child
custody disputes,97 and bringing interspousal tort actions.98 The
application of this literature to criminal domestic violence also
would prove fruitful. The available literature is the best source for
careful construction of evidentiary presentations on domestic vio-
lence.99 One must bear in mind the basics: that domestic violence
94. For a discussion of self-defense as a defense to murder, see generally A. JONES, supra
note 2.
95. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of protective orders, see Note,
Spouse Abuse: A Novel Remedy for a Historic Problem, 84 Dic. L. REv. 147, 157-58 (1979-
80); Note, supra note 12, at 277-79.
96. For a general discussion of grounds for divorce, see Comment, supra note 24, at 553-
55.
97. For a discussion of the "best interests doctrine" in child custody determinations, see
Gordon, The Best Interests Doctrine: Its Application in Divorce, Modification and Non-
Parental Disputes, 8 J. Juv. L. 184 (1984). For a discussion of techniques for interviewing a
child during custody proceedings, see Newman & Collester, Children Should be Seen and
Heard, FAm. ADvoc., Spring 1980, at 8, 10-11. For a discussion of mediation and other alter-
natives to litigation in child custody cases, see Evarts & Goodwin, The Mediation and Ad-
judication of Divorce and Custody: From Contrasting Premises to Complementary
Processes, 20 IDAHO L. REv. 277 (1984); Shepard, Philbrick, & Rabino, Ground Rules for
Custody Mediation and Modification, 48 ALB. L. REv. 616 (1974).
98. For a discussion on the effects of interspousal tort immunity on the abuse victims'
ability to obtain redress for injuries, see Note, supra note 95, at 151-53; Comment, supra
note 24, at 569-70.
99. For a discussion of the use of expert testimony as a means of counteracting the com-
mon attitudes toward battered women, see Comment, The Use of Expert Testimony in the
Defense of Battered Women, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 587 (1981). For an analysis of the prereq-
uisites to the admissibility of expert testimony in abuse cases, see Comment, The Admissi-
bility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw.
U.L. REv. 348 (1982).
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escalates, that economic and psychological dependencies form, and
that many practical obstacles stand in the way of victim self-help.
1. Domestic violence escalates
The first instance of violence suffered by a spousal victim is usu-
ally short and not terribly severe. Acccordingly, viewing the crime
as an aberration and thus forgivable is easy. Later in the pattern of
violence, however, the same victim faces a serious threat to life and
health, and may be past the ability to forgive but nonetheless too
afraid to change the situation alone.100 Since child abuse generally
also escalates from small incidents to more violent occurrences, it
also might seem acceptable initially to the victim and to those in-
dividuals concerned. Unfortunately, the legality of reasonable cor-
poral punishment makes more insidious the tendency to accept as
trivial ever-increasing violence against a child.
2. Dependencies and other obstacles to leaving home
One of the few identified characteristics of batterers is low self-
esteem. Low esteem is also one of the consequences of domestic
violence for the victim. Both the abuser and the abused thus be-
lieve that they cannot survive without the other.'0 ' Additionally,
the victim quite often is isolated from family and friends 0 2 or at
least warned not to tell anyone about the abuse suffered. If the
abuser can support the family without the victim's assistance, the
victim might well be unemployed. Accordingly, if the victim de-
cides to leave, neither money nor free help are available. Indeed,
100. See supra note 2.
101. See, e.g., BATrERED WOMEN 20-25 (D. Moore ed. 1979). One of the main reasons why
battered women often choose to remain in an abusive environment deals with the combina-
tion of hope and love. Strong bonds exist between marital partners, and the abused spouse
faces a real dilemma in deciding to leave a spouse who apologizes after each beating, pledges
love, and intends to change. In addition, many abused spouses feel a great sense of loyalty
to their batterers. This aspect only adds to the victim's dilemma. Id.
102.
A wife assault victim may be quite isolated. Her husband may actively work at
keeping her that way. She probably has few friends or sources of support. If
she does have friends, she may never have told them of her home situation....
The more isolated a woman is in her own home, the more dependent she is
upon her mate for any input about her value as a person.
J. FLEMING, supra note 14, at 87-88.
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even if the victim is employed, the batterer might control the fam-
ly money. 03 Battered women's shelters are the best available solu-
tion to these problems, at least for adult victims.
D. Threats
Batterers who fear losing their victims frequently resort to
threats against the victim, the victim's loved ones, or anyone else
who offers the victim any help. 04 These threats further discourage
the victim and make leaving home harder. The problem of threats
from the criminal abuser, however, is one which the criminal jus-
tice system is not entirely powerless to handle. Instead of forcing
the victim to hide temporarily in a shelter, a more proper and just
focus on the criminal, rather than the victim, would suggest the
use of mechanisms commonly used in criminal law, such as incar-
cerating the criminal until trial, revoking bond, or requiring the
posting of significant bond to be forfeited if the accused engages in
further violent crime before trial. At these preliminary stages, one
must take care to prevent the judge's failure to take the threat of
domestic violence seriously. One simple method that may be help-
ful at this point, and later, is characterizing the abuser as "defend-
ant" and "perpetrator," and the abused spouse as "victim" and
"complainant," rather than calling them "spouse," "husband," or
"wife." Educating the court about the characteristics of domestic
violence should pave the way for trials, convictions, and sentenc-
ings to proceed as they would in a case of nondomestic violence.
After a few cases have been prosecuted successfully, such cases will
become easy and commplace.
103. In the majority of violent marriages, the husband has complete control over family
finances and most abuse victims rarely have any money to call their own. J. FLEMING, supra
note 14, at 83-84. Professor Freeman gave the following example: "In Scream Quietly or the
Neighbors Will Hear, Eriz Pizzey quotes one battering husband who taunts his wife by
saying to her: 'Where can you go? What can you do?' This encapsulates the state of
powerlessness and dependence which many women find themselves in." Freeman, supra
note 14, at 222.
104. Many abuse victims fear retaliation by their spouses. Fleming describes the personal-
ity of the batterer who threatens retribution as a "controller"-a person who is used to
getting his or her way. The abuser opposes the victim's attempts to leave because the abuser
would then lose the ability to control the victim. Initially, the abuse victim may have been
attracted to this type of person because he or she seemed very capable of handling things. J.
FLEMING, supra note 14, at 294.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Forcing victims of domestic crime to leave home and break up
families in order to end the violence in their lives reflects the crim-
inal justice system's abdication of its role in modifying unaccept-
able behavior. This failure exacerbates the widely lamented social
problem of family breakdown and leads directly to the rupture of
families that might otherwise become usefully functioning units of
society. The burdens and consequences of crime should fall as
completely as possible upon the perpetrator of crime, not upon the
already injured victim. The necessary laws and procedures are in
place; it is past time to use them to end domestic violence-and
thereby reduce a major source of all violence-in our society.
